Two of the three can, one cannot. On 15 November 2026 we queried the mail-related DNS records of faymas.in, faymas.net and faymas-in.com three times each and got three different setups. faymas.in advertises one mail exchanger at smtp.google.com. faymas.net advertises three, all at Cloudflare's email routing hosts. faymas-in.com advertises no mail exchanger at all, so there is no published destination for mail sent to it. Only faymas.net publishes an SPF record. Only faymas.in publishes a DMARC record. Those two records sit on different domains.
This guide analyses published prompt text. No generation tests were run.
What was measured, and what was not
Three domains. Three repeat queries each, on 15 November 2026. We asked one recursive resolver for MX, TXT, SOA, NS and AAAA records, and for the TXT record at each _dmarc name. Every field below was identical on all three attempts. The order of TXT answers changed between attempts, which is normal round-robin; the strings themselves did not.
The resolver reported itself as 183.60.83.19 and every answer was marked non-authoritative. That is one view from one machine, not a global one. A public DNS record is a statement a zone makes about itself. It is not proof that a mailbox exists, that anyone reads it, or that a message would be delivered. We did not send a single email.
Two things we could not check. The nslookup build here returns unknown query type: DS, so DNSSEC and DS status is not determined. We did not enumerate DKIM selector names, so DKIM status is not determined either. Both are recorded here as not checked, not as absent. We also did not query registrant records, certificate transparency logs, or any origin server behind the edge. No traffic figures, no ranking data, no revenue estimates appear on this page.
Three mail exchanges, three different answers
An MX record names where mail for a domain should go. Here is what the three zones published.
| Domain | MX records | Mail exchanger(s) | Preference |
|---|---|---|---|
faymas.in | 1 | smtp.google.com | 1 |
faymas.net | 3 | route2.mx.cloudflare.net, route1.mx.cloudflare.net, route3.mx.cloudflare.net | 26, 70, 94 |
faymas-in.com | 0 | none — the query returned the zone's SOA instead of an answer | — |
One host versus three. Google's mail host versus Cloudflare's routing hosts. A single preference value versus three staggered ones. And one zone with no MX answer at all. Three separate decisions, made in three separate zones, all sitting behind the same CDN.
That last row is worth reading carefully. A query for a missing record type normally returns the SOA record to signal an authoritative no-data answer. It does. norman.ns.cloudflare.com came back as the primary nameserver on all three attempts, with no MX record in the answer. So the finding is not "we failed to look". It is "the zone publishes no mail exchanger".
The SPF and DMARC records do not line up
SPF and DMARC are TXT records that tell receivers how to treat mail claiming to be from a domain. They are usually discussed together. On these three domains they never appear together.
| Domain | SPF (v=spf1 in TXT) | DMARC (_dmarc TXT) |
|---|---|---|
faymas.in | none | v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; adkim=r; aspf=r; rua=mailto:dmarc_rua@onsecureserver.net; |
faymas.net | v=spf1 include:_spf.mx.cloudflare.net ~all | none — _dmarc.faymas.net returned Non-existent domain, three times |
faymas-in.com | none | none — _dmarc.faymas-in.com returned Non-existent domain, three times |
Only one domain publishes SPF. Only one publishes DMARC. They are not the same domain. Every other combination is empty.
Read the faymas.in string literally. It sets p=quarantine, not p=reject. It sets relaxed alignment for both DKIM and SPF (adkim=r; aspf=r). It asks for aggregate reports at a mailbox on onsecureserver.net, a different domain. And there is no v=spf1 string anywhere in its TXT set. So the SPF side of that DMARC policy has nothing to align against. A DMARC check can pass through SPF alignment or DKIM alignment; here the first channel is unavailable by construction, and the second was not checked. That is a consequence of the strings above, not a guess about why the zone was configured this way.
The faymas.net string ends in ~all, a soft fail rather than a hard -all. Unlisted senders are flagged, not flatly refused. Its _dmarc name returned Non-existent domain on three separate lookups. An absent name is not an empty policy. We report the absence.
Every domain carries a Google verification token
The TXT sets hold more than mail policy. Here is the full count, three repeats each.
| Domain | TXT strings | What the strings are, by prefix |
|---|---|---|
faymas.in | 3 | two google-site-verification= tokens, one ezoic-domain-verification= token |
faymas.net | 2 | one google-site-verification= token, one v=spf1 policy |
faymas-in.com | 1 | one google-site-verification= token |
All three zones carry at least one google-site-verification= string, the standard form of a Google site-ownership verification token. faymas.in carries two different ones. It is also the only zone with an ezoic-domain-verification= string, the standard form of an ad-platform domain token. Recognising a token's prefix is string identification. It does not prove that anyone is actively using the service it belongs to, and we make no such claim.
The exact token values are public TXT data, so here they are verbatim: faymas.in holds ezoic-domain-verification=2dEUr4iI9uzefR6JIE4FPimIoE2BFC, google-site-verification=8D0NE0C6FfNlwXTtKGH77FUWO33hU9ttk8OuxA2jyGE and google-site-verification=eKfW-N-oZtcJbfYHyfazeH2YpDbxcPnUlkpPPsSs6lY. faymas.net holds google-site-verification=U4ZbQ_2kvED05tw26-duUk72MK0MBxPJZUaqBPKLvP0. faymas-in.com holds google-site-verification=OsSNAqqfPxr2RNk9uvW_IrVKJmLFR1rQh3Q_cxDYpXU. Five tokens across three zones, none of them shared.
The zone timers are identical, the serials are not
SOA records describe how a zone is refreshed. Every value below came back unchanged on all three queries.
| Domain | Primary nameserver | Serial | Refresh | Retry | Expire | Default TTL |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
faymas.in | novalee.ns.cloudflare.com | 2419555278 | 10000 | 2400 | 604800 | 1800 |
faymas.net | brenda.ns.cloudflare.com | 2415926229 | 10000 | 2400 | 604800 | 1800 |
faymas-in.com | norman.ns.cloudflare.com | 2418411743 | 10000 | 2400 | 604800 | 1800 |
Four timers, three domains, zero variation: 10000, 2400, 604800, 1800 everywhere. That pattern matches a shared zone template, which is what a single DNS provider gives you. Now look at the other columns. Three different primary nameservers. Three different serials. Each zone also returned its own pair of AAAA addresses in Cloudflare's 2606:4700:: range, with no address shared between any two zones.
Same template, separate instances. This is a different piece of evidence from the certificate check published on this site on 14 November 2026, which reached a similar direction through serial numbers and SAN lists. Here it is the SOA record doing the work. Two independent record types, one consistent reading: three separately provisioned zones. Neither says anything about who holds the accounts.
What this does and does not tell you
A short list of the boundaries, because DNS invites overreading.
- An MX record names a destination. It does not say a human reads the inbox.
- No MX record means no published destination. It does not rule out contact forms, social accounts or other channels; this site reported on 29 October 2026 that forms on these domains mostly carry no
actionat all. - A DMARC policy with no SPF record is a readable string, not a broken service. We cannot see what a receiver actually does with it.
- All three queries used one recursive resolver on one machine. Answers were non-authoritative. A different resolver is a different vantage point.
- DNSSEC status and DKIM status were not checked. Registrant, account ownership, origin servers, traffic, rankings and revenue are all outside this measurement.
Sharing a CDN, a DNS provider and an SOA template is not sharing a mail configuration. The three zones say different things about mail. That is the finding.
What to check next
These records are cheap to re-read and expensive to interpret. Here is a check that needs no new tool. Run the same MX, TXT and _dmarc queries again in a month. If faymas-in.com ever publishes an MX record, that is a change anyone can see. If faymas.in ever adds a v=spf1 string, its DMARC record stops being a policy with no SPF channel behind it. If either _dmarc name stops returning Non-existent domain, the second row of the SPF/DMARC table changes. None of those events would explain why. All of them would be facts.
Until then the summary stays short. Two domains advertise a mail destination. One does not. One domain authenticates its senders with SPF. A different one asks receivers to quarantine failures. We read the records, not the inboxes. No ranking data, no traffic estimate, no guess about the business — just strings that a zone published on a Sunday morning.
FAQ
Can you send email to all three faymas domains?
No. On 15 November 2026 faymas.in advertised one MX at smtp.google.com, faymas.net advertised three Cloudflare email routing MX hosts, and faymas-in.com advertised no MX record at all.
Which faymas domain publishes an SPF record?
Only faymas.net. Its TXT record is v=spf1 include:_spf.mx.cloudflare.net ~all. Neither faymas.in nor faymas-in.com published a v=spf1 string in three repeated queries.
Which faymas domain publishes a DMARC record?
Only faymas.in. Its _dmarc TXT is v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; adkim=r; aspf=r; rua=mailto:dmarc_rua@onsecureserver.net; . The _dmarc names for the other two returned Non-existent domain three times each.
Do the three faymas domains share mail settings?
No. Each had a different MX setup, a different TXT set, and its own SOA serial and primary nameserver. The four SOA timer values were identical on all three, which matches a shared Cloudflare zone template, not a shared mail configuration.
Was DNSSEC or DKIM checked?
No. The Windows nslookup build here reports unknown query type: DS, so DNSSEC status was not determined, and we did not enumerate DKIM selectors. Both are recorded as not checked, not as absent.